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ETHNIC MINORITY WOMEN IN GEORGIA 
– FACING A DOUBLE BURDEN? 
This paper examines the situation of women belonging to ethnic minorities, one of the 
most vulnerable social groups in the Republic of Georgia. Minority women carry the 
double burden of belonging to frequently discriminated ethnic groups, as well as to the 
historically suppressed gender. It focuses on gender-based discrimination and violence –  
and the social structures and norms that cause them – as well as impediments to 
women’s economic empowerment and political participation. First it looks at the 
situation of women among the Azeri  and Armenians, Georgia's two largest minority 
groups. Domestic violence is endemic to their communities, especially in rural areas. 
Women take care of household and family, as dictated by social norms, but also face 
increasing economic pressures, especial ly in areas where labor migration is common. 
Azeri women are particularly exposed to such problems. They also suffer from the 
effects of early marriage and childbirth. The paper also considers women in some of the 
smaller minorities (Ossetian, Kist, Yezidi  Kurdish, Roma), whose situation is not as well 
documented as that of Azeri and Armenian women. Throughout the paper it emerges 
that women across different ethnic minorities face similar difficulties, and that the 
political and social isolation of minorities contributes to the low status of women within 
them.1 
 
Andrea Peinhopf  
February 2014 
ECMI Working Paper # 74 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I explore the situation of ethnic 
minority women in Georgia, focusing on gender-
based violence, economic empowerment and 
political participation. Importantly these are not 
distinct topics, but interrelated phenomena: 
domestic decision-making structures and 
violence are the main obstacles to increased 
female participation in the political and 
economic spheres. Conversely, women‟s 
second-rate role here has diminished their ability 
to become financially independent and publicly 
recognized, which could strengthen their 
domestic position.
2
 Over the past years the 
Georgian government has introduced several  
legal measures directed at alleviating some of 
the problems Georgian women encounter and 
strengthening their position in society, including 
the National Action Plan on Gender Equality 
(2011-2013), the National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace and Security (2012-2015), as 
well as action plans on domestic violence (2011-
2012), and trafficking in human beings (2011-
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2012). However, according to the UN Gender 
Thematic Group, consisting of domestic and 
international organizations with a gender focus, 
implementation of the national action plans has 
been uneven, with the National Action Plan on 
Gender Equality significantly lagging behind.  
Regarding issues of gender-based 
violence, as well as economic and political 
participation, the national action plans on 
domestic violence and gender equality are 
currently the most important legal documents. 
Following the 2010 Law on Gender Equality, 
the National Action Plan (NAP) aims to (a) 
enhance gender equality in public institutions, 
(b) introduce gender topics to the education 
system and increase public awareness of them, 
(c) encourage equal participation of men and 
women in the national economy, (d) support 
women‟s equal political participation, and (e) 
mainstream gender in the social sphere, as well 
as in the health care system.
3
 Experts, however, 
complain that the broad and all-encompassing 
character of the action plan is actually one of the 
main factors hindering its implementation. The 
domestic violence-NAP, on the other hand, 
focuses on the implementation of the 2006 Law 
on Domestic Violence, public awareness 
campaigns and the protection of and assistance 
to victims of domestic violence.
4
 Two state-
funded crisis shelters for women were opened in 
Tbilisi and Gori over the last years; the majority 
of facilities, however, are operated by non-
governmental organizations such as „Sakhli‟ and 
the „Anti-violence Network of Georgia.‟5 
In both action plans, ethnic minority 
women are granted special attention, along with 
rural women and IDPs. The NAP on gender 
equality, for instance, highlights the particular 
need to conduct seminars and trainings for “the 
rural population, IDPs and ethnic minority 
women,” as well as to support business-oriented 
education of women belonging to these 
particularly vulnerable groups.
6
 Furthermore, the 
NAP suggests special programs to identify 
representatives of national minorities and 
increase their skills and capacities. The NAP on 
domestic violence, on the other hand, includes 
informational-educational meetings “with the 
following target group: (a) internally displaced 
persons: (b) rural population, (c) ethnic 
minorities.”7  
However, according to the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, the Georgian government, which 
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) in 1994, lacks the necessary data to 
develop policies tailored to the particular needs 
of certain segments of the Georgian population. 
In its Concluding Comments, the Committee 
expressed concerns “about the lack of 
information on the situation of rural women and 
ethnic minority women in the areas covered by 
the Convention” and demanded that the 
government “enhance its collection of data […], 
disaggregated by sex as well as by ethnicity, age 
and by urban and rural areas.”8 So far, the 
Georgian government has remained ambivalent 
about these matters, emphasizing the right to 
self-identification codified in Article 3 of the 
Council of Europe Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities.”9  
Despite valid skepticism about the value 
of an ethnic perspective on gender questions in a 
country where the situation of women is 
significantly determined by other factors, such 
as geographical location or age group, the lack 
of information on minority women is still 
striking. This paper strives to partially fill this 
gap by contributing to a better understanding of 
the situation of ethnic minorities regarding 
gender-based violence, as well as the economic 
and political participation. Such an undertaking 
must from the beginning acknowledge that, at 
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times, improvements in women‟s situation and 
the advancement of minority rights might not 
always be easily reconciled. As it will emerge in 
the following chapters, the comparatively strong 
discrimination of women within ethnic 
minorities can only be fully explained in 
reference to the minorities‟ traditional gender 
norms, which prevent women from equal 
opportunities, rather than problems inflicted by 
the majority on these groups.  
Research for this working paper was 
conducted between November 2012 and March 
2013, and draws on secondary sources, as well 
as fieldwork in the minority regions of Kvemo 
Kartli (Azeri) and Samtskhe-Javakheti 
(Armenian). To expand the picture, qualitative 
meetings were conducted with representatives of 
minority organizations (including members of 
the Gender Working Group of the Council of 
National Minorities), women NGO leaders, 
members of local self-governance, students, 
student representatives, rural women, teachers, 
and academic experts. 
II. AZERI WOMEN IN GEORGIA 
The following three sections present the 
situation of Azeri women in regards to gender-
based violence, economic empowerment and 
political participation. Azeri women in Georgia 
are often regarded as the most vulnerable 
members of society due to the double burden of 
belonging both to the historically discriminated 
gender, and to an ethnic and religious minority. 
While religion factors into the different roles 
attributed to men and women throughout the 
Caucasus, the strict division of gender roles 
typical for Muslim societies places Azeri women 
in a particularly difficult position.  
 Yet, in the case of the Azeri community 
in Georgia, the traditional Muslim practice of 
confining women to motherhood and family was 
somewhat mitigated by the experience of a 
Soviet ideology of gender equality that 
encouraged women‟s political and economic 
participation. In addition to the supposed 
liberation of women in the Soviet Union, Azeri 
women in Georgia have witnessed the 
transformation of a former communist country 
into an increasingly functioning democracy over 
the past few years. While political participation 
remains low among ethnic Azeris, there is little 
doubt that the majority of them nowadays 
regards Georgia as their homeland and wants 
their children to become more involved in the 
development of Georgian society.
10
 Increased 
awareness of the social and economic 
opportunities Georgia can offer has contributed 
to the willingness to integrate. Along with recent 
efforts to expand language training for youth and 
young adults from ethnic minorities, this gives 
reason to be at least cautiously optimistic about 
the future of Azeri women in Georgia.  
 
2.1 Gender-based violence 
Domestic violence: Facts and figures 
While domestic violence occurs across ethnic 
groups, it is widely assumed that Azeri women 
are particularly prone to experience gender-
based violence. The Reproductive Health Survey 
Georgia 2010, conducted by the Georgian 
Center for Disease Control and Public Health in 
collaboration with the Georgian Ministry of 
Labor, Health, and Social Affairs, indicates that 
Azeri women are almost twice as likely as ethnic 
Georgians to experience verbal and/or physical 
abuse in their marriages:
11
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Verbal and physical abuse by an intimate partner 
is particularly wide-spread in the Azeri 
community: here almost one-third of women 
reported verbal abuse during their lifetime and 
9% indicated that their husband or partner had 
inflicted physical harm on them. The data also 
suggests that the situation has not improved in 
recent years: the rates for verbal and physical 
abuse of Azeri women „during the last 12 
month‟ are also roughly double those for ethnic 
Georgian women. Considering that overall rates 
of domestic violence have remained relatively 
stable (at least since comprehensive data was 
first collected in 1999) this points to deeply 
entrenched problems in gender-relations inside 
Azeri families.
12
  
Another report, the National Research 
on Domestic Violence against Women in 
Georgia (2010), suggests that the main divide in 
the incidence of domestic violence lies between 
urban centers and rural areas (rather than 
ethnicity). Conflicting data exists on this 
phenomenon – the Reproductive Health Survey 
reports near-identical rates of intimate partner 
violence (IPV) for urban and rural women  
 
 
respectively
13
 – but might attest to a problem 
mentioned by the authors of the National 
Research, namely that urban residents are more 
aware of the very concept of gender-based 
violence and hence better able to share their 
experience of violence with strangers.
14
  
 The latter is confirmed by government 
statistics, which show that domestic violence is 
grossly under-reported to the police. According 
to the official report Domestic Violence, 
Domestic Conflicts and Juveniles 2007-2011 
published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs the 
largest ratio of reported violent incidences 
occurred in Tbilisi (5.4 per 10,000 citizens), 
followed by Mtshkheta-Mtianeti (3.4). Kvemo 
Kartli, with 1.6 cases of violence reported per 
10,000 citizens, does not stand out.
15
 But these 
numbers should be read with a grain of salt as 
they only indicate instances of domestic 
violence that were registered by the police.
16
 
Even a brief comparison with the Reproductive 
Health Survey brings out the higher proportion 
of domestic violence crimes that are unreported. 
If the numbers estimated by the survey are even 
remotely accurate
17
 the national averages in each 
Characteristic Lifetime – 
Verbal 
Abuse 
Lifetime – 
Physical 
Abuse 
Lifetime – 
Sexual 
Abuse 
Last 12 
Months – 
Verbal 
Abuse 
Last 12 
Months – 
Physical 
Abuse 
Last 12 
Months – 
Sexual 
Abuse 
National 
Average 
14.8 4.5 1.7 8.4 1.4 0.5 
Georgian 13.4 3.9 1.7 7.7 1.2 0.5 
Azeri 29.6 8.9 2.3 18.1 2.5 0.4 
Armenian 13.2 6.0 1.9 5.7 1.1 0.0 
Others 26.8 10.3 2.3 15.2 4.7 0.0 
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category applied to the roughly 1,000,000 
Georgian women between 15 and 44 (which is 
the age group covered by the survey) would 
suggest that 14,000 instances of physical 
violence, 5,000 instances of sexual violence and 
84,000 instances of verbal violence are 
perpetrated against these women annually. The 
police, on the other hand, only reported 1,025 
instances over the course of five years. Based on 
the high reliability of the Reproductive Health 
Survey, it can be concluded that there is, indeed, 
a higher prevalence of domestic violence among 
ethnic Azeris despite the low number of 
officially registered instances of domestic 
violence in Kvemo Kartli.  
Traditional gender norms and family structure 
One of the most frequent explanations for the 
problem of domestic violence in Georgia is the 
economic hardship caused by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Although the actual number is 
hard to estimate given their frequent 
involvement in the informal market, several 
local experts affirmed that in many cases women 
have become their families‟ main breadwinners 
due to high male unemployment caused by the 
unviability of traditionally male-dominated 
sectors, such as the industrial sector, during the 
1990s.  
 It is reported that women turned out to 
be more flexible to adjust to the new economic 
circumstances by taking up economic activities 
that did not fit their actual qualification. It is 
therefore not surprising that one of the main 
reasons for domestic violence identified by the 
respondents of the National Research on 
Violence against Women in Georgia was “male 
unemployment depriving the man of his 
traditional position in the family (frequently 
coupled with drinking, sometimes with drug 
addiction)”.18 Yet, the reaction to changing 
gender roles is only a symptom of the deeply 
engrained gender stereotypes discriminating 
women, often referred to as the “Caucasian 
mentality”.   
 In the case of the Azeri population of 
Georgia many of our interviewees shared the 
view that this Caucasian mentality is amplified 
by Muslim traditions and beliefs, a perception 
that is corroborated by the Study of social and 
economic conditions and attitudes of Kvemo 
Kartli population (2011), conducted by the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
together with the Institute of Social Studies and 
Analysis. They found that the percentage of 
those accepting violence against women is 
highest among ethnic Azeris: 16.5% of the Azeri 
respondents fully agreed with the statement that 
“if the husband uses physical violence against 
the wife (physical punishment), it means the 
wife has deserved it,” compared to 10% of 
Armenians and 8.3% of ethnic Georgians. While 
there is little direct assent to violence, Azeri 
women display a number of troubling, and 
sometimes contradictory, attitudes towards 
gender relations, reaffirming the trend of on-
going domestic violence discussed above. The 
fact that 63.4% of Azeris respondents agree that 
“a good wife and mother will never deserve bad 
treatment by the husband” suggests that wives 
and mothers who fall short of social expectations 
(who are not „good‟) could be considered 
legitimate targets of violence by their 
husbands.
19
 Furthermore, according to the 
Reproductive Health Survey, 84.9% of Azeri 
women agreed with the statement that “a good 
wife obeys her husband” (compared to the 
national average of 42.5%) and only 52.6% 
regard it as legitimate for a woman to refuse 
intercourse if her husband has a sexually 
transmitted infection (the national average is 
76.5%).
20
  
Domestic violence is only one 
manifestation of an unbalanced power structure 
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within the family, according to which the 
woman‟s position is subordinated to that of her 
husband. Yet, a closer look at the traditional 
structure of Azeri families reveals the latter 
notion to be shortsighted. As Leila Suleimanova, 
chairwoman of the Union of Azerbaijani 
Women of Georgia remarks, often it is the 
mother-in-law who plays a crucial role in the 
appearance of domestic violence, not only 
among ethnic Azeris.
21
 Frequently, the husband 
or son is only the formal head of the family 
while his mother wields the actual power not 
only over the family‟s financial resources but 
also about her daughter-in-law‟s personal 
freedom and individual choices.
22
 Importantly, 
this phenomenon is not limited to Azeri families, 
as highlighted by the National Research on 
Violence against Women in Georgia, according 
to which “the victims of violence, as well as 
policemen, experts, and service providers (…) 
state that domestic violence is mainly 
perpetrated by a husband and his family (mostly 
mother-in-law)”.23 The complexity of gender 
relations could be well observed during a visit to 
a traditional Azeri family in the village Kvemo 
Bolnisi in February 2013. While the (male) head 
of the family expressed liberal views regarding 
women‟s rights, none of the women around the 
table contributed to the conversation except for 
the grandmother who turned out to be the actual 
head of the family.  
 Consequently, an accurate description of 
the problem of gender-based violence has to take 
into account that both men and women can be 
victims, as well as perpetrators. A woman might 
be a victim of domestic violence when she is 
young, but can become a perpetrator herself at 
an older age. Similarly, a husband who represses 
his wife might be simultaneously repressed by 
his own mother. While the extended family is 
traditionally seen as the fundamental unit of 
social interaction and support within Azeri 
culture, the notion of the family as a “sacred 
place” is thus contradicted by the fact that the 
family is the sphere where most forms of 
violence occur. The lack of private space creates 
a close, but tense atmosphere that facilitates 
violent and non-violent abuse. According to 
Nargis Alieva, deputy chairwoman of the Union 
of the Azerbaijani Youth in Georgia, and herself 
a young mother, the lack of private space is one 
of the biggest problems for young couples who 
can hardly afford to live separately given the 
limited employment opportunities in Kvemo 
Kartli.
24
  
Early marriages  
Gender experts and women NGO leaders 
identify the prevalence of early marriages as the 
biggest obstacle for Azeri women to participate 
in the country‟s social, political and economic 
life, as well as one of the main reasons for the 
high incidence of domestic violence. In Azeri 
culture, marriage (and divorce), traditionally 
governed by sharia law (despite regional 
variations), is seen as a social and political 
occasion between families rather than an 
intimate relationship between individuals. 
Marriage was, and continues to be, considered a 
contract, through which “a man gained full 
authority over his wife and children.”25 In 
practice, however, authority over newly-wed 
women was exercised by their mother-in-law or 
other older women of the husband‟s family. 
Most marriages were and still are patrilocal, 
barring instances where the bride‟s family has 
no sons.
26
  
 Men and women under the age of 18 are 
permitted to marry under Georgian law if they 
are at least 16 years old and obtain parental 
consent. Individuals who are 18 or older do not 
require parental consent. According to official 
GEOSTAT figures for 2011, most marriages 
occurred between individuals from the age 
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group 22 to 29 (roughly evenly distributed 
between those ages), with a tendency for men to 
marry somewhat later in their lives. In 2011, 659 
women and 39 men under the age of 18 were 
registered for marriage. In Kvemo Kartli a total 
of 130 underage girls (58 sixteen-year olds and 
72 seventeen-year olds) were married, but only 
two men (both aged 17).
27
 Kvemo Kartli, 
furthermore, displays a significant disparity 
between the ages at which men and women are 
first married. While the situation for men does 
not deviate from the nation-wide picture, women 
here are significantly more likely to marry at a 
relatively young age. One fifth (25%) of female 
under-age marriages occur here (though only 
one-tenth of the total Georgian population 
resides in Kvemo Kartli), and numbers for 
females peak at the ages of 18 and 19 (compared 
to 20-21 nationally). Importantly, this does not 
apply to Azeris living in urban areas such as 
Rustavi, where figures match with national 
trends. The gender disparity in marriage age 
confirms other statistics indicating that Azeri 
women, concentrated in Kvemo Kartli, tend to 
marry men significantly older than themselves. 
According to Leila Suleimanova, 
chairwoman of the Union of Azerbaijani 
Women of Georgia, the numbers of early 
marriages has been decreasing since the 1990s, 
with the exception of the villages of Algeti, 
Azizkendi, Sabirkendi, Kizil-Adjlo in Marneuli 
municipality, as well as Nakhiduri and Kvemo 
Bolnisi in Bolnisi municipality, where it is still 
common for girls to marry at the age of fourteen 
or fifteen. According to Suleimanova, marriage 
is an institution that attracts young girls because 
of the attention that is involved in the Azeri 
marriage tradition, allowing young girls to feel 
like “princesses”.28 Formalities and rites 
between elchilik (asking for the bride‟s hand) to 
the completion of the marriage ceremony often 
take weeks, or even months, including initial 
contact between the senior female members of 
each family, protracted gift-giving, the three-day 
long wedding celebrations, and the bride‟s 
public bath on the seventh day after 
consummation of the marriage.  
With virginity being an essential 
criterion for potential brides, curiosity about sex, 
“triggered by TV and internet,” is cited as 
another reason for the appeal of early 
marriages.
29
 This highlights the problematic 
consequences of the dictate of premarital 
virginity that causes young girls to take 
irresponsible choices, posing a severe danger to 
their physical health. Underage marriages often 
lead to early physical aging related to early 
childbearing and a high abortion rate. This is 
substantiated by the Reproductive Health 
Survey, according to which Azeri women have 
the highest fertility rate in the country (2.4 
compared to 2.0 for ethnic Georgians).  
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Age-specific fertility rates by ethnicity/region:
30
  
Characteristic 15-19 
(live 
births per 
1000) 
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 Total 
Fertility 
Rate 
(births per 
woman) 
Georgian 30 141 117 65 30 9 2.0 
Azeri 143 184 96 18 29 0 2.4 
Armenian 59 118 101 70 22 0 1.9 
Other 
Ethnicity 
66 144 111 60 40 73 2.5 
 
The rates among Azeri women only surpass the 
average in the two lower age groups, between 
the ages of 15-19 and 20-24 respectively, 
showing that Azeri women not only have more 
children in general, but have them at an earlier 
age.
31
 Despite the fact that abortions have 
decreased in Georgia, Azeris still have the 
highest abortion rates for all age groups (3.3 
compared to 1.6 nationally).
32
  
By depriving young women of the 
possibility to make an informed choice about 
their life partner, early marriages not only have 
violent consequences, but are violent acts in 
themselves, classified as human rights violations 
in international law.
33
 To compare – the 2010 
UNICEF study on the prevalence of early 
marriages in Azerbaijan, mentions a wife‟s 
obedience as one of the reasons for early 
marriages: the patriarchal family model in 
Azerbaijan „demands from wives a strict 
obedience and subordination to their husbands. 
Thus, the independent sense of self that a girl 
may develop during adolescence is seen as 
undesirable. The younger the bride, the greater 
the chances are of conditioning her into the 
appropriate subservient behavior.“34 However,  
 
none of our interviewees supported early 
marriages. They voiced strong objections, citing 
the value of education for women and the 
importance of mutual respect for a successful 
marriage. 
Young Azeri representatives emphasize 
that early marriages should not be regarded as a 
problem limited to the Azeri community. 
Reducing it to a religious problem is, indeed, 
shortsighted; as some of our interviewees 
pointed out “mental maturity and sound 
judgment” are the decisive criteria for marriage 
eligibility according to the Quran.
35
 However, a 
clear-cut distinction between religion and 
cultural traditions was made impossible by the 
so-called „privatization‟ of religion in the Soviet 
Union era that lead to the elimination of the 
intellectual and ideological dimensions of Islam. 
According to Nayereh Tohidi, a professor of 
Gender and Women‟s Studies at California State 
University and expert on the sociology of gender 
and religion in Muslim societies, Azeris had to 
turn their religious beliefs into private traditions 
and practices in order not to display their 
Muslim identity.
36
 As a consequence, many 
Azeris have only limited knowledge of their own 
religion and are susceptible to mistake early 
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marriage for a strict religious principle. 
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that 
early marriages have an economic dimension 
too. It was not only the attempted emancipation 
of women that decreased underage marriages 
during Soviet times, but also the basic social and 
economic securities provided by the state that 
partly relieved the family from its traditional 
function as the sole safety net. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, marriage – traditionally 
regarded as a form of social advancement – 
regained its crucial function as a means to 
overcome economic uncertainty and poverty 
through the support of the extended family.  
Bride abduction  
Deficient state structures incapable of enforcing 
a reduction of early marriages after the Soviet 
collapse, a general lack of awareness campaigns 
and an increased adherence to Muslim traditions 
caused the revival of bride abductions in the 
90ies, which has also had an important impact 
on the prevalence of early marriages. In recent 
years, however, there has been a significant 
decrease in bride abductions in Georgia due its 
criminalization as a “deprivation of liberty” 
under §143 of the Criminal code of Georgia 
introduced in 2004.
37
 Yet, in 2006, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) required the 
Georgian government to “include in its next 
report information on marriages in Georgia 
involving girls under 18 and on the prevalence 
of the abduction of women for purposes of 
marriage, particularly among ethnic minority 
women.”38 However, in its combined fourth and 
fifth periodic report from 2012, the Georgian 
government responded that the “abduction of 
women for the purpose of marriage occurs very 
rarely [and that] such abductions are often 
arranged elopements.”39 The National Research 
on Violence against Women in Georgia from 
2010, on the other hand, reported that Azeri 
women from Marneuli identified the abduction 
of young women as “a type of violence that, in 
their words, is widespread among 
representatives of their ethno-religious group”.40 
According to the Azeri respondents “abducted 
girls are only 12-13 years old and cannot take 
proper care not only of their husbands and their 
families, but also of themselves; usually 
husbands forbid them to go to school and to 
continue their studies, and sometimes – even 
visit their friends and parents.”41 However, none 
of our interviewees confirmed the view that 
bride kidnapping is still a widespread 
phenomenon. Most of them could recall only 
one or two cases of which they were not even 
sure if they were voluntary or not. For example, 
Leila Mamedova from the Union of Azerbaijani 
Youth in Georgia remembered only one case of 
serious kidnapping over the last years, while all 
others turned out to be voluntary.
42
 And 
according to Samira Ismayilova, chairwoman of 
the Azerbaijani Students‟ Association of 
Georgia, “bride kidnapping is no longer a 
problem.”43  
Despite the fact that the phenomenon of 
bride kidnapping has been widely eradicated 
during the last few years, a widespread fear of 
bride abduction persists among members of the 
Azeri community, providing a potential excuse 
for parents to restrict their daughters‟ liberties. 
Bride kidnapping therefore continues to be a 
„real‟ problem inasmuch as it is still perceived 
(or claimed to be perceived) as a threat that 
influences parental behavior. What underlies the 
fear of abduction, however, is not solely a worry 
about girls‟ personal freedom, but about their 
virginity and by that the honor of the family.
44
  
The prevalence of a perceived threat of 
bride abduction became particularly apparent 
during a field trip to an Azeri village in Kvemo 
Kartli. As one of our interviewees, a traditional 
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middle-aged Azeri man, pointed out, the choice 
regarding his own daughters was not between 
marrying or not, but between getting abducted 
and not having any choice at all on the one hand 
and getting married at an age at which one 
would not want to marry under ideal 
circumstances.
45
 In this vein, early marriages are 
sometimes considered the „lesser evil.‟ Yet, 
what first appears like a genuine concern for the 
well-being and self-determination rights of 
young girls, is often essentially a worry for the 
girls‟ „honor,‟ closely linked with the reputation 
of the whole family. Once a girl is abducted, her 
virginity, and thereby her whole integrity, is put 
at stake. As a consequence, some girls choose to 
stay in marriage with their kidnapper and his 
family in order to save her personal status as 
well as the status of her own family. Yet, it 
would be false to downplay bride abduction as 
part of mainstream Azeri tradition. While bride 
kidnapping is frequently perceived as a 
traditional form of marriage, ethnographers 
point out that it is, in fact, an “anti-tradition”: As 
the German social anthropologist Elke Kamm 
explains, bride kidnapping was historically seen 
as a way to escape from the high costs of 
traditional wedding ceremonies, as “a violation 
of existing traditional marriage rules” and 
therefore “had little respect from the head of the 
family”.46 
Despite the general negative attitude 
towards the individual self-determination rights 
of women, qualitative research revealed that 
there is a certain respect for women taking an 
individual choice by escaping an arranged 
marriage. However, it turned out that this was 
only the case where women subsequently led 
successful lives. Fleeing an arranged marriage 
becomes a brave act only if it leads either to a 
successful voluntary marriage or to a successful 
career.
47
  
 
2.2 Economic empowerment 
Employment  
Rural Azeri communities in Kvemo Kartli 
largely participate in the so-called informal 
economy, understood as “a system of trade or 
economic exchange outside state controlled or 
money based transactions.”48 Members of those 
communities rely on traditional, non cash-based, 
economic activities, such as household 
production, bartering, subsistence farming, and 
labor exchanges for their financial livelihood. 
Recent research into three representative villages 
in the area showed that 90% of farmers and two-
thirds of service providers regularly engaged in 
such non-cash activities.
49
 These activities are 
not, or only partially, included in official 
statistics, complicating government and NGO-
efforts to tackle poverty in the region. Azeri 
women play a particularly important role in 
informal economic activities. A 2012 study by 
Mercy Corps and the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation found that cheese 
production was the most significant good for 
bartering.
50
 Because women traditionally make 
the cheese, they outnumber men as participants 
in non-cash exchanges. They are also 
responsible for choosing and exchanging or 
purchasing food and household goods for the 
family. Involved women indicated that they 
enjoyed the timesaving effect through the direct 
exchange of goods. While this is true for women 
in the Kvemo Kartli region in general, it applies 
particularly to Azeri women, “who often face 
restrictions on their movement outside the 
home.”51 
Although they are not equal participants 
in Georgia‟s economy, women are widely 
perceived as having been better able to deal with 
the economic difficulties and high 
unemployment rates of the post-Soviet period. 
Since the early 1990s women dominate in the 
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fields of small-scale trade and consumer 
services, engaging in economic activities such as 
street vending and subsistence agriculture, 
demonstrating a higher flexibility to engage in 
low status jobs. Despite the shift in gender roles 
regarding the traditionally male role of the main 
breadwinner, which has been taken over by 
women in many cases, there has not been a 
corresponding shift in the distribution of 
household duties and childcare responsibilities.
52
 
Consequently, many Azeri women often cover 
three main areas of work: domestic work 
(cooking, cleaning, etc.), agricultural work 
(growing the field, harvesting), and the selling of 
their products. Local experts describe the role of 
men in this process as limited to stereotypical 
work such as „carrying boxes‟ or „driving the 
car.‟53 However, since the status of head of the 
family is now detached from the role of main 
breadwinner and men regard themselves as 
superior regardless of their actual contribution, 
most of the tasks performed by women are not 
even regarded as work, unlike traditional female 
occupations such as teaching or social work.
54
 
Traditional gender stereotypes also 
strongly impact on women‟s access to financial 
credits due to their frequent lack of property 
ownership. According to USAID‟s gender 
assessment, “it is customary for men to be given 
preference in property inheritance, ownership 
and administration”.55 This discriminating 
practice prevents women from equal 
participation in business: “Although there are no 
legal barriers to women‟s right to own property, 
in practice women are generally not owner of 
real property and therefore they face an 
additional burden in finding the collateral 
needed to obtain credit and business loans.”56 
While this is a general problem concerning the 
whole country, ethnic Georgians again hold 
more progressive opinions on the issue. 
According to the 2011 study on Kvemo Kartli, 
the majority of respondents (59.1%) support the 
statement that men and women should have 
equal rights to property. Still, it has to be noted 
that even though the majority of Azeris share 
this view, they are still less supportive than 
ethnic Georgians, suggesting that the illiberal 
inheritance tradition is more widespread in their 
communities.
57
 
A closely related issue is the poor 
knowledge of the state language, which does not 
only reduce the employment opportunities of 
Azeri women (and Azeris in general), but also 
limits implementation of rights granted to 
women under Georgian law, such as equal 
property rights. The numbers provided by 
various non-governmental reports estimate that 
between 30% and 78.3% of Azeris do not speak 
Georgian.
 58
 Yet, the majority of Azeris have a 
positive attitude towards the Georgian language, 
showing great awareness of the fact that a 
professional command of the state language is 
the precondition for social and economic 
advancement. During several field trips to 
Kvemo Kartli it also emerged that most adults 
want at least their children to be fluent in 
Georgian, which is supported by figures from 
the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation: 67.3% of the Azeri respondents 
support preschool education in Georgian, 83.8% 
school education, 71.9% vocational education, 
and 72.1% higher education.
59
 Although there 
are no official figures regarding the language 
skills of students, all expert and non-expert 
interview respondents agreed that these skills are 
continuously improving.  
Education 
As already mentioned, the post-communist 
period saw a revival of early marriages, causing 
a higher drop-out rate for Azeri schoolgirls. 
Even though all interviewees agreed that the 
school dropout rate is diminishing and an 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
14 | P a g e  
 
increasing number of young Azeri girls finishes 
schools and even continues higher education, the 
drop-out rate still remains higher for ethnic 
Azeris than other nationalities. The Study of 
Social and Economic Conditions and Attitudes 
of Kvemo Kartli Population from 2011 
identified a lower involvement of Azeris in 
school education (93.4% compared to 98% for 
other groups). Despite a general unwillingness to 
justify absence from school, illness and „no 
desire to study‟ were the most frequently used 
reasons for withdrawing from education in 
Marneuli (around 27%), with illness being stated 
as the main reason in Bolnisi (66.7%) and 
distant location of school in Dmanisi. Marriage 
was named as a reason only in Marneuli (9%), 
Dmanisi (11.5%) and Tetriskharo (6.7%).
60
 
However, regional experts such as Leila 
Suleimanova are convinced that marriage is one 
of the most frequent reasons for Azeri girls to 
leave school early. In fact, equal education for 
girls and boys is less valued among ethnic 
Azeris than among other ethnic groups: 71.6% 
of Azeris compared to 94% of other ethnic 
groups in the region agreed with the statement 
that receiving education is equally important for 
both boys and girls in a survey conducted by the 
Civil Development Agency together with 
UNDP. 23.2% of Azeri respondents think that 
education is more important for boys.
61
 Often, 
schools are not perceived as primarily 
educational institutions, but as places full of 
temptations (including the threat of abduction). 
In order to avoid “temptations” and maintain the 
girl‟s premarital virginity, parents sometimes 
decide to take them out of school. However, as 
Leila Suleimanova emphasizes, by dropping out 
of school and getting married young girls lose 
any chance to find a job as they lack the most 
fundamental skills, noting that today even small 
supermarkets require basic computer skills and 
no longer hire completely unqualified staff.  
Yet, Samira Ismayilova, chairwoman of 
the Azerbaijani Students‟ Association of 
Georgia emphasizes that a negative attitude 
towards education for young girls is no longer 
the norm. Thanks to the state-funded program 
“one-plus-four” (instituted by the previous 
Georgian government) that offered one year of 
intensive Georgian language training and four 
years of fully funded university education to 
Azeri and Armenian students who passed the 
entrance examinations in their respective 
minority languages, 254 Azeri students entered 
Georgian universities in 2011 and 384 in 2012.
62
 
Ismayilova, whose student association organized 
an extensive information campaign in 100 Azeri 
schools, highlights the importance of 
information in order to increase parents‟ 
willingness to send their daughters to 
universities: “People in the regions live very 
isolated, they need to be introduced to what is 
going on outside their village.”63 Yet, as Nargis 
Alieva from the Union of Azerbaijani Youth in 
Georgia remarks, even those girls who are eager 
to study in order to find a good job face the 
reality of a poorly developed economy and a 
lack of job opportunities in their region, forcing 
many well-educated young Azeris to migrate to 
Turkey, Russia or Azerbaijan. While the 
majorities (58%) of labor migrants in Kvemo 
Kartli are male, there is a considerable 
percentage of women (42%) who migrate to 
Greece, Italy or Turkey, while male migrants 
mostly choose post-Soviet countries.
64
 
 
2.3 Political participation 
While about 53% auf Georgia‟s population is 
female, only 17 women have been elected to the 
parliament in the elections in 2012, accounting 
for 11.33% of MPs.
65
 Although this is the 
highest number of female MPs since 
independence in 1991, women continue to be 
heavily underrepresented despite efforts made 
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by the Georgian government to increase female 
participation in political parties through financial 
incentives.
66
  
None of the current female MPs belongs 
to an ethnic minority, nor do any of the female 
ministers
67
. In the past, the only minorities that 
had a better representation of their female 
members were Greeks and Abkhazians. No 
Azeri woman has ever served in parliament.
68
 
Currently there are three Azeri MPs, all men. 
Although it was difficult to track down the 
number of female candidates from the Azeri 
community, local experts emphasized that those 
women who were on the party list often did not 
know about their nomination. According to Leila 
Mamedova, women were pressured to accept 
their candidacy.
69
 On the other hand, participants 
at a conference on the implementation of the 
„Win with Women Global Action Plan“70 by the 
National Democratic Institute reported that those 
female candidates who were genuinely 
motivated, on the other hand, faced opposition 
from their male counterparts. However, Azeri 
students‟ representative Samira Ismayilova, who 
was a candidate for UNM, emphasized that – 
contrary to her expectation – she did not 
experience any difficulties or strange reactions.
71
  
Ethnic minority women or women in 
general are traditionally better represented on 
the regional level. According to USAID, 
„women have fared slightly better at the local 
level and make up a larger proportion of local 
council (sakrebulo) members (11%) since „they 
are more likely to be known by the electorate in 
their city or town“.72 Regarding Kvemo Kartli, 
conflicting accounts of the number of female 
Azeri sakrebulo members were encountered. 
Some sources named three Azeri women in the 
sakrebulo, while others insisted that there is only 
one. The lack of visibility of female sakrebulo 
members is surprising, as even regional experts 
and NGO representatives were unaware of their 
existence. This lack of information can be 
explained by the impression that women are 
often only formally members and do not fulfill a 
real function in the local council. Local experts 
complained that, in fact, most of the political 
work is done by the husband. During our 
research we were able to have a short meeting 
with one – or perhaps the only – Azeri sakrebulo 
deputy, who works as a school teacher and 
became a sakrebulo deputy „because people 
elected her“.73 This and the fact that she was 
barely able to describe her work confirmed the 
suspicion that women‟s participation in politics 
remains largely formal.  
However, experts remark that Kvemo 
Kartli has always been at the bottom regarding 
equal political participation of both genders. 
According to the Kvemo Kartli study conducted 
by the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation, „ethnic minorities are not involved 
in the current developments taking place in 
Kvemo Kartli region, which manifests in low 
awareness of different social issues, low level of 
involvement in the programs and low level of 
cooperation with government structures“.74 
Moreover, the study concludes that the general 
lack of interest in politics is even more 
widespread among women than men.
75
 Leila 
Mamedova from the Union of Azerbaijani 
Youth of Georgia, on the other hand, insists that 
the stereotype of the Azeri woman in the kitchen 
in fact does not live up to reality, for Azeri 
women are „very active.“76 All local experts 
report a normal participation of women in the 
2012 parliamentary elections compared to the 
earlier periods when it was common for the man, 
as the head of the family, to take the passports of 
all eligible family members in order to vote on 
their behalf. Yet, despite such positive 
developments, it can be assumed that women do 
not vote fully independently, but according to 
the choice of the whole family. Nonetheless, 
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NGO representatives stress the positive tendency 
towards lively political discussions at home and 
in local communities and emphasize that there is 
no longer only one opinion per village. What 
remains are often mainly practical difficulties: 
during a training organized by the Union of 
Azerbaijani Women of Georgia in the 
parliamentary pre-election period 17 out of 20 
participants were not able to complete the ballot 
paper correctly.
77
  
The lack of formal political involvement 
is in contrast to Azeri women‟s strong voice in 
the public sphere. There are several 
organizations engaging in gender issues, among 
them the Union of Azerbaijani Women in 
Georgia (Leila Suleimanova), the Union of 
Azerbaijani Youth in Georgia (Leila Mamedova) 
as well as the Azerbaijani Students‟ Association 
of Georgia (Samira Ismaiylova). This confirms 
the general trend that women in Georgia 
predominate in the civil society sector. What 
first appears progressive can partly be 
interpreted as a confirmation of the stereotypical 
role of women as „caretakers‟ due to their 
„traditional concern for social problems“78. 
However, headed by strong but pragmatic Azeri 
women, these organizations not only enable a 
greater participation of Azeri women in the 
social, economic, political and cultural life from 
within the Azeri community itself, but also 
ensure that the needs of Azeri women do not 
remain unheard in the broader discussions on 
gender equality in Georgia.  
III. ARMENIAN WOMEN IN 
GEORGIA 
Armenian women also belong to the more 
vulnerable groups in Georgia, suffering from a 
high incidence of domestic violence linked to 
their geographical and social isolation. The 
common perception is that Armenian women are 
more conservative than ethnic Georgians, but 
less so than members of the Azeri community, 
who are more constrained by their religious 
traditions and socialization. 
This section assesses the situation of 
Armenian women in Georgia, residing in the 
remote and still not fully integrated region of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, especially in the Armenian-
dominated municipalities of Akhalkalaki and 
Ninotsminda, as well as in the regional centre 
Akhaltsikhe, where approximately 37% of the 
population is Armenian. While there is another 
significant community of Armenians residing in 
Tbilisi – 7.6% of the city‟s total population 
according to the 2002 census – they are 
generally well integrated and therefore less 
pertinent to the present research. 
 
3.1 GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
Domestic violence 
According to the 2010 Reproductive Health 
Survey, 6% of Armenian respondents reported 
cases of physical violence, compared to 3.9% of 
ethnic Georgians and 8.9% of female Azeris. 
While Armenian women are more likely to be 
physically abused than Georgian ones (but less 
likely than Azeri women), they are on par with 
Georgians in terms of verbal abuse (see table in 
section 2.1). Importantly, the higher rate of 
physical abuse is not reflected in the cases of 
domestic violence reported to the police. 
According to statistics published by the 
Department of Information and Analysis of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the ratio of violence 
reported in Samtskhe-Javakheti (0.7 incident of 
domestic violence per 10 000 citizens) does not 
stand out when compared with the reporting 
ratio in Tbilisi (5.4) and Mtskheth-Mtianeti 
(3.4)
79
.  However, as mentioned before, one 
should take into account that rural women, long 
accustomed to gender-based discrimination and 
violence and with little exposure to mainstream 
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Georgian society, are less aware of the very 
notion of domestic violence and of its 
prohibition under Georgian law. They also tend 
to have a higher inhibition threshold to report 
violent acts within the family, considering to 
damage or threaten the reputation of their kin. 
The geographical distance and little trust in state 
authorities could be further reasons for 
Armenian women‟s hesitancy to consult the 
police in cases of domestic violence.  
While a deficient knowledge of 
Georgian does not necessarily hinder Armenian 
women from approaching the police in 
Armenian-dominated regions where officials are 
likely to speak their language
80
, it can still 
complicate women‟s access to information about 
services provided by the state, such as shelters 
for victims of domestic violence or crisis 
centers. According to an employee of the 
Akhaltsikhe crisis center led by the Tbilisi-based 
NGO „Anti-Violence Network of Georgia‟ 
(AVNG), the proportion of ethnic Armenians 
looking for assistance at the crisis center is 
extremely low. There was not a single Armenian 
woman in the shelter near Akhaltsikhe at the 
time of our interview, and no more than three 
over the past five years
81
.  She explained the 
reluctance to take advantage of anti-violence 
services through the “specific Armenian 
mentality,” as well as a lack of information and 
an absence of trust. Some scholars argue that the 
Armenian understanding of the domestic realm 
differs from other Caucasian nationalities as the 
family additionally functions as a „fortress‟ 
against cultural assimilation: “For Armenians, 
the family represents the centre of affective life 
and, no less importantly, the means by which 
they resisted cultural assimilation and physical 
destruction as a people through centuries of 
onslaught by Arabs, Mongols, Turks and other 
ethnically or religiously alien peoples. Countless 
proverbs express the centrality of the family to 
ethnic „survival‟, and the complementary of 
men‟s and women‟s roles in this joint 
endeavours [sic].”82  Yet, the habit of keeping 
silent about violent acts by a husband or partner 
(intimate partner violence, or IPV) is not 
particular to ethnic Armenians, but characteristic 
for women in rural areas across Georgia. 
According to the National Research on Violence 
against Women in Georgia “there is a very low 
percentage of [women] who seek help and share 
their experience outside of close social 
networks:” 3.2% of women who were victims of 
domestic violence reported talking to a priest, a 
mere 2% approached the police and only 1% 
sought help from a women‟s NGO.83 
Gender norms and power relations 
As with the Azeris, the prevalence of domestic 
violence within the Armenian community is 
rooted in an inherently discriminatory power 
structure within the family. Armenian gender 
attitudes, which range from rather liberal to very 
conservative, rank somewhere in-between those 
of ethnic Georgians and Azeris. In 2004, the 
Institute for Policy Studies in Tbilisi published 
the study Gender & Society in Samtskhe-
Javakheti, which explored the needs of women 
in the region. The fieldwork included an 
exercise with 8
th
-graders who were asked to 
write essays about the way they imagine their 
future ten-years ahead, which were then 
analyzed. The essays revealed more traditional 
ideas about the position of women among 
students from Armenian schools in Akhlkalaki 
and Ninotsminda, who were more likely to 
discuss their marriage and future family than 
pupils in other parts of Samtskhe-Javakheti. 
Moreover, “Armenian [students] were much 
more exact and concrete in their plans, 
demonstrating stronger stereotypes, pragmatism 
and adherence to traditional values, while the 
Georgian writings were more focused on 
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patriotic feelings and general social problems.”84 
The report concluded that “there is a difference 
in the level of personal freedom women enjoy 
across these two ethnic groups, as the free 
movement of Armenian women is more 
restricted.”85  
The more recent Reproductive Health 
Survey confirms this divide between Armenians 
and Georgians in their ideas about gender roles: 
Armenians are much more likely to subscribe to 
traditional gender norms and stereotypes than 
ethnic Georgians. According to the survey only 
60.2% of Armenian respondents think that “a 
woman can refuse sex if her husband has an STI 
(sexually transmitted infection)” compared to 
78.8% of ethnic Georgians and 52.6% of Azeris. 
The statement “A good wife obeys her husband” 
is supported by 55.8% of Armenians, 84.9% of 
Azeris and 38.8% of ethnic Georgians. This 
again suggests that Armenian women rank in 
between Azeri and Georgian women in terms of 
(perceived) gender equality.
86
 However, as the 
authors of Gender & Society in Samtskhe-
Javakheti remark, it is not the ethnic profile as 
such, but the ethnic balance, which is decisive 
for the situation of Armenian women, as the 
freedom of Armenian women is more limited in 
Armenian-dominated Ninotsminda and 
Akhalkalaki than in other regions of Samtskhe-
Javakheti.
87
  
While the family honor requires women 
to be modest and subservient, there is still an 
agreement that Armenian women, like Azeri and 
Georgian women, sometimes exercise more 
power than it is formally recognized. As Tsira 
Meskhishvili, chairwoman of the Samtskhe-
Javakheti association „Toleranti‟ remarks, 
Armenian women are somehow suppressed and 
powerful at the same time. Women participate 
actively in projects and discussions and have a 
strong impact on their husband‟s decisions. 
According to Meskhishvili, “women are active, 
but somehow hold on to their own 
subordination.”88 For scholar Nora Dudwick this 
phenomenon is not a paradox but captures an 
„organic relationship‟ between man and women 
that is best expressed in the Armenian analogy 
of a married couple to a body, in which the man 
is the head and the women the woman the neck. 
As Dudwick explains, “people frequently point 
out that although the head supposedly makes the 
decisions and controls the body, in fact, women 
subtly control the head, for „as the neck turns, so 
turns the head‟. Both proverbs stress the 
supportive and subordinate nature of women‟s 
relationship to men.”89  
This stressful position is also reflected in 
the difficulty of reconciling civic involvement 
with the household duties traditionally assigned 
to Armenian women. With one exception, all 
participants in a focus group meeting with active 
women in Akhalkalaki explained that their 
dedication was only possible because they did 
not have a family. The only married woman at 
the table, on the other hand, characterized the 
unconditional support from her family as 
“exceptional”.90 Yet, regarding younger 
generations, our interviewees observed first 
changes in traditional gender relations, 
indicating that young men are generally more 
open-minded and ready to take a share in the 
household. Pirusa Tergregorian from the Union 
of Armenian Support, for instance, reported to 
see more and more men picking up their 
children from the kindergarten, “something, 
which would not have happened in the past.”91 
Finally, it is interesting to observe that 
the statement “nothing is possible without your 
family” seems to apply not only to married but 
also to divorced women, as they rarely live on 
their own after separating but move back to their 
parental family. There they are again exposed to 
the controlling behavior of a man, be it the 
father or a brother. However, active women 
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agree that once a woman is successful in her 
profession, she will receive the necessary respect 
for her work: “People do not care about words 
here, it‟s all about deeds. If you are a successful 
woman no one will really have a problem with 
you.”92  
Early marriages and bride abductions 
While early marriages have the highest 
frequency among ethnic Azeris, they are also 
rather a common phenomenon among 
Armenians, as was illustrated by the essay 
exercise for the 2004 study Gender & Society in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, in which Armenian girls in 
Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki tend to express 
their negative attitude towards early marriage, 
displaying awareness that this would prevent 
them from further professional development.
93
 
Official GEOSTAT data from 2011 for the 
whole region of Samtskhe-Javakheti lists 32 
underage persons who got married, with only 
one of them male (seventeen-years old) and the 
rest girls, 14 of them sixteen-years old and 17 
seventeen-years old. The overall situation in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti reflects national trends, with 
most persons (male and female) getting married 
in their 20ies. While the numbers of marriages 
stated in the UNFPA Reproductive Health 
Survey give no indication about age and 
ethnicity, some conclusions can be drawn on the 
basis of the information related to fertility. 
Judging by fertility rates, which the survey 
disaggregated by ethnicity and age, and keeping 
in mind that few pregnancies occur outside 
marriage, it is reasonable to surmise that 
Armenian women tend to marry later than Azeri 
women.
94
 This trend was also observed by our 
interviewees, including NGO leaders, a school 
principal, Sakrebulo members and local 
residents. 
While local residents and experts agree 
that the tradition of early marriages as well as 
the practice of bride abductions is in decline, our 
field research in Javakheti strengthened the 
impression that the fear of bride abduction is 
still widespread. That this fear does not remain 
abstract, but can have a real impact on young 
women‟s life was illustrated by the example of 
an Armenian female student in Tbilisi, who had 
to discontinue university for one semester due to 
a male student who behaved like a potential 
bride kidnapper. After spending one semester 
with her parents in Akhalkalaki she returned to 
Tbilisi and finished university.  
During a meeting with women‟s 
activists in Akhalkalaki we also came across the 
phenomenon of voluntary kidnapping. One 
woman reported that her daughter ran away with 
her boyfriend at the age of 17, just few months 
before graduating from school. We were told 
that she now lives with her husband‟s family, 
suffering from the discriminating behavior of 
her mother-in-law and her husband‟s 
grandmother. As her mother explained, young 
girls tend to see early marriage as an opportunity 
to have a legitimate sexual relationship and often 
fail to consider the potential long term 
consequences of their actions, such as 
subordination by the mother-in-law. Overall, the 
idea that women are predestined to marry is still 
widespread, even among active Armenian 
women: “A woman should get married, but not 
too early. She should finish her education first 
and then get married.”95 
 
3.2 ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT 
Employment 
Rural inhabitants of Samtskhe-Javakheti largely 
depend on subsistence agriculture for their 
financial livelihood. While the region is 
Georgia‟s largest producer of potatoes, and as 
such holds potential for economic development, 
a number of obstacles such as irrigation 
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problems and a lack of infrastructure and 
farming technology have impeded progress. The 
Akhalkalaki municipality, mostly populated by 
ethnic Armenians, is largely reliant on such 
subsistence farming, posing a significant 
obstacle to their integration into the Georgian 
economy, and Georgian society at large. The 
situation is equally troubling for Armenians in 
Ninotsminda, whose main source of income are 
remittance payments from family members 
working abroad. The situation in the urban 
center Akhaltsikhe is somewhat more promising: 
here the majority of people are able to sustain 
themselves financially through wage-based 
labor. In recent years the government has 
undertaken efforts to improve the economic 
situation in Samtshke-Javakheti – irrigation 
problems are being tackled and transportation 
projects are being pursued, such as the road 
between Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki, the 
Akhalkalaki-Ninotsminda-Tsalka-Tbilisi road 
and the railway from Tbilisi to Akhalkalaki.
96
 
The extent to which these endeavors will 
improve the situation of the still-isolated 
Armenian communities, however, remains to be 
seen.  
The 2004 survey on gender and society 
in Samtskhe-Javakheti notes that women-headed 
households in Samtskhe-Javakheti were more 
likely to assess their financial situation 
negatively.
97
 Rural Armenian women in this 
region are likely to bear the main share of the 
economic burden, as they are responsible for 
tending to the livestock.
98
 They are also in 
charge of marketing and selling most of the 
produce. As a report by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation indicates, women 
here carry the double burden of being expected 
to run their households and look after their 
children and yet be full-time breadwinners as 
well.
99
 They perform both demanding 
reproductive and productive roles. One woman 
cited in the survey remarked: “I am the man and 
the woman in my family when my husband goes 
to work.”100 The situation is even more difficult 
for those rural women whose husbands left the 
country seeking seasonal labor mainly in other 
post-Soviet countries. A large share of labor 
migration abroad occurred between 1996 and 
2004, when circular migration was the primary 
economic strategy for many members of ethnic 
minorities.
101
 This is particularly the case for 
ethnic Azeri and Armenians, where labor 
migration is predominately male, seasonal, and 
oriented towards Russia. Here remittance 
payments are often relied on as the primary 
sources of income, keeping the receiving 
families from the poverty line. Samtskhe-
Javakethi has the highest rate of remittance-
receiving households in Georgia.
102
 According 
to Nazel Demorchian, chairwoman of Women 
for Peaceful Georgia, there are villages in which 
almost all men of working-age have left, while 
their wives need to take over all tasks involved 
in agricultural production, in addition to taking 
care for their families.
103
 This heavy burden 
combined with infrastructural shortcomings 
place those women in a particularly vulnerable 
position. This was confirmed during an ECMI 
Caucasus meeting organized in Akhalkalaki, 
where women from the village Aragava 
mentioned difficulties they face as a 
consequence of living without husbands, forcing 
them to work in the fields together with their 
children. It is therefore not surprising that most 
of their complaints concern insufficient 
infrastructure such as the inadequate irrigation 
system, incomplete gas supply, lack of leisure 
clubs for young people, bad conditions of 
schools, as well as pressing issues affecting their 
agricultural livelihood such as the high price of 
fertilizer. However, despite the difficulties they 
face, the meeting highlighted the exceptional 
ability of rural women to deal with their 
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problems independently and within the 
community.
104
  
Armenian women in the local urban 
centers, on the other hand, work in traditionally 
female occupation, e.g. as teachers, nurses or 
shop assistants, but most recently also bank 
assistants. Employment opportunities, however, 
are not only curtailed by discriminatory gender 
norms, but by a general lack of jobs concerning 
both men and women. While self-employment 
might offer a solution to that problem, women‟s 
activists from the region emphasize the 
difficulties women face if they want to engage in 
more professional economic activities. One 
woman who participated in an economic 
empowerment program told us that the 
realization of her business idea failed due to the 
adverse, male-dominated environment. Yet, in 
general, only few women are aware of the 
existence of micro credit institutions in their 
region.
105
  
Apart from traditional gender norms, the 
lack of adequate Georgian language skills was 
named as one of the main impediments for 
Armenian women to find employment in the 
local administration. Figures from an ECMI 
report from 2009 indicated the highest level of 
lack of language skills among Armenians in 
Akhalkalaki (47.2%), followed by Ninotsminda 
(28.2%) and Akhaltsikhe (6.7%).
106
  
Education  
As findings by the Civil Development Agency 
reveal, Armenians are less conservative in 
regards to equal access to education for boys and 
girls than Azeris, but less open than ethnic 
Georgians, with 15.9% of Armenian respondents 
agreeing that education is more important for 
boys, compared to 4.3% of Georgian and 23.2% 
of Azeri respondents.
107
  
According to a school principal in the 
village Tskaltbila and also a sakrebulo member 
in Akhaltsikhe, the dropout rate of Armenian 
girls has decreased over the past few years and 
young Armenian girls are now more likely to 
finish secondary school than before. Thanks to 
the government program “one-plus-four” the 
number of Armenian students enrolled in 
university has increased. According to official 
numbers, 75 Armenian students participated in 
the program in 2010, 179 in 2011 and 191 in 
2012. Despite the non-availability of gender 
disaggregated data it can be assumed that the 
number of female students has also increased. 
As one interviewed school principal remarks, 
there is even a tendency towards an increasing 
gender imbalance regarding young men, with 
more girls enrolled in higher education than 
boys and the number of girls leaving the region 
to study in the capital becoming higher.
108
 
However, a comparison with the number of 
Azeri students enrolled in the government 
program reveals that the participation of 
Armenians is significantly lower, as the share of 
Azeri students rose to 384 in 2012, compared to 
191 Armenian participants.
109
 Active women in 
Akhalkalaki weigh in that the quality of teaching 
is still poor in some areas of the region, and it 
continues to adversely affect both girls‟ and 
boys‟ chances to pass the university entrance 
exam.
110
 First successes of the “one-plus-four” 
governmental program should not obscure the 
overall picture: young members of ethnic 
minorities remain underrepresented in tertiary 
education and those who choose to attend 
university are likely to alienate themselves from 
fellow members of their native communities. 
The latter especially holds true for minority 
women – Azeri and Armenian alike – who, at 
least nominally, have every right and 
opportunity to enter higher education, but in 
doing so are bound to violate the value system of 
their families.  
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3.3 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
No Armenian woman currently serves in the 
Georgian parliament, compared to three 
Armenian men, and there has only been one 
female Armenian MP in the past.
111
 Their 
representation is slightly better in the regional 
councils, with three Armenian women being 
members of the sakrebulo in Akhaltsikhe and 
one in Ninotsminda. Overall there are four 
female Armenian sakrebulo members in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti. Strikingly there is not a 
single female sakrebulo member in Akhalkalaki, 
even though the share of ethnic Armenian 
residents is over 90%. According to our 
interview partners, there was one female 
Armenian head of the sakrebulo in the past and 
one Armenian woman in the sakrebulo in 
Akhalkalaki in 2006, who was “not active”.112 
The head of the local NGO Toleranti named the 
current system of self-government as one of the 
impediments to genuine political commitment: 
women in the sakrebulo must be party members, 
binding them to the opinion of their party. An 
interview with two sakrebulo members (one of 
them a deputy) confirmed the lack of personal 
motivation, for both were “invited” to join the 
sakrebulo. One of them told us that, “they 
wanted me to become a member, so I said yes.” 
As a secretary in the sakrebulo for many years, 
becoming politically involved “just seemed 
natural”. 113 Both interviewees emphasized that 
their work is perceived in a positive way by men 
in their community. One was strongly supported 
by her husband, while the other one emphasized 
that their male colleagues treat them in a polite 
way. Both women did not seem particularly 
aware of gender issues; however, one of them 
asked us to organize an information session on 
women‟s right in her village at the end of the 
interview, suggesting that women show an 
increased interest in politics and tend to attend 
political discussions more often than men.  
Compared to Akhaltsikhe, the role of 
Armenian women is even more limited in 
Akhalkalaki. As already mentioned, the local 
sakrebulo has currently no female member, 
contradicting the assumption that political 
positions are easier accessible for ethnic 
minority women in regions where their 
nationality forms the overall majority of the 
population. In Akhalkalaki, where 80% (25 out 
of 31) of the sakrebulo members are ethnic 
Armenians there is not a single woman, while in 
Ninotsminda, where 94% of the population are 
Armenians, there is only one female member. As 
stated by a representative from the Javakheti 
Citizens‟ Forum, one of the fundamental 
problems for female sakrebulo members is that 
they are not able to freely articulate their ideas 
and opinions in the male-dominated local 
assembly. The leader of “Women for a Peaceful 
Georgia” and a candidate in the local elections 
in 2010 stressed the difficult environment for 
women willing to become politically active. In 
regard to her own candidacy, male members of 
the sakrebulo went as far as trying to convince 
her to withdraw her candidacy. She frequently 
had to face questions like “What do you need 
that for?” and “Why do you want to make your 
life more complicated than necessary?”114 
All women interviewed in Akhalkalaki 
underlined the need for quotas to end the 
nominal candidacies by women. However, they 
also pointed to a more fundamental problem, 
namely that both men and women remain largely 
detached from the political processes and 
uninterested in political questions. According to 
our interviewees, “women cannot be forced to 
become active, but have to wish to engage in 
politics themselves.”115 When asked about their 
own ambitions to enter the formal sphere of 
politics, they emphasized their unwillingness to 
associate themselves with a political party. 
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Especially in the villages, a lack of 
interest in political affairs is largely determined 
by a limited access to information in minority 
languages. As the Study of Multi-Ethnic Society 
in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti 
observed, almost two-thirds of the non-Georgian 
population of Samtskhe-Javakheti receives 
information in Armenian and Russian, with only 
35% in Georgian. Although there are at least two 
local channels that transmit news in Armenian in 
Russian, they do not cover all parts of Samtskhe-
Javakheti. Yet, there are two times more Internet 
users in Samtskhe-Javakheti (23.9%) than in 
Kvemo Kartli (11.3%), with the most popular 
Internet source being „Odnoklassniki‟ 
(Classmates) among non-Georgians.
116
  
All politically active women candidates 
interviewed in Akhalkalaki underlined the lack 
of information and awareness as one of the 
biggest problems during their pre-election 
campaign projects in 2012. Some experienced 
several times interferences by men during their 
information campaigns, causing the campaigners 
to limit attendance at events to women only. All 
interviewees mentioned shortcomings in the 
election observations, allowing cases when men 
voted on behalf of their female family members. 
However, these cases could not be verified.  
Yet, with few women‟s organisations or 
NGOs with a gender focus the concerns of 
Armenian women certainly have a voice in the 
public sphere. Compared to Kvemo Kartli, 
NGOs in Samtskhe-Javakheti are still less 
present and active and there is no Armenian 
women‟s organization with same 
professionalism and experience as the Union of 
Azerbaijani Women of Georgia.
117
 This could 
either be attested to an absence of political and 
social motivation among Armenian women, or – 
more positively – to the comparatively better 
situation of Armenian women who simply might 
not see the need for such organized forums.  
IV. GENDER ISSUES OF 
SMALLER MINORITIES 
This section considers the situation of women in 
Georgia‟s less populous minorities. The Azeris 
and Armenians together account for over 10% of 
the Georgian population. The third largest 
minority are ethnic Russians (1.55%), followed 
by even smaller minorities such as Ossetians, 
Yezidis (0.42%), Greeks (0.35%), Ukrainians, 
Kists, and Roma.
118
 The present discussion will 
be rather superficial at this stage, as not much 
attention has been paid to those groups. The 
attempt of this section is to signal the issues by 
specifically looking at gender relations in the 
following groups: Kist, Yezidi, Roma, and 
Ossetians. For the purpose of this study the first 
three of those are most interesting, as they 
remain culturally isolated and as such are clearly 
distinguishable as ethnic minorities. While 
gender problems occur in the remaining groups, 
they are harder to grasp as minority-specific 
problems due to the strong integration on one 
hand and the conflict situation between Georgia 
and South Ossetia that have complicated their 
situation on the other. A full-fledged discussion 
of the social relations in those minorities, 
specifically in regards to gender, would require 
an assessment both of those conflicts and of 
their relationship with the countries and regions 
with which they identify.
119
  
 
4.1 OSSETIAN WOMEN 
While Ossetians living outside the conflict zone 
of South Ossetia have almost assimilated to the 
Georgian majority, they experienced 
discrimination in the aftermath of the war, often 
branded as „separatist‟ and sympathizer.120 The 
Georgian-Russian 2008 war thus signified a step 
backwards for an ethnic group previously well-
embedded in the Georgian society and 
reinforced the tendency not to display their 
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distinct cultural identity. Roughly one-tenth of 
Ossetians currently reside in the Republic of 
Georgia. The 2002 census estimates the number 
of Ossetians living in Georgia (excluding the 
autonomous region of South Ossetia) at around 
38000, although the ECMI estimates the current 
number to be much lower (26000 in 2009). Most 
Ossetians speak fluent Georgian; older members 
also speak Ossetian.  
According to Mzia Kochlaeva from the 
International Association of Ossetian Women 
Alaneli, domestic violence is as big a problem 
for Ossetian women as it is for the rest of 
population of rural Georgia. Ossetian women 
mostly engage in domestic work, as well as 
agriculture. Despite a general low level of 
economic activity among Ossetian women, a 
proportionally higher level of activity was 
reported among Ossetian women in Akhmeta 
and Lagodekhi.  
However, as it was emphasized, the 
biggest grievance for Ossetian women is the 
“loss of their homeland, which has left them torn 
between North Ossetia, South Ossetia and 
Georgia”.121 The situation of Ossetian women is 
therefore mostly discussed in the context of 
conflict resolution. However, despite Georgia‟s 
efforts to increase women‟s participation in the 
peace process through the introduction of the 
National Action Plan on „Women, Peace and 
Security,‟ experts note that the number of female 
participants has decreased recently and criticize 
the Georgian government for an undue focus on 
figures rather than on the actual influence of 
female participants.
122
 Much of the work of 
Ossetian organizations is therefore devoted to 
support Ossetian women in dealing with the 
burden of the conflict.  
There is a certain number of Ossetian 
IDP women from mixed families who are spread 
across Georgia‟s various IDP settlements, 
although there is no specific statistical data 
available. There is also no evidence about a 
higher rate of domestic violence among IDPs; 
qualitative research, however, suggests that IDP 
women belong to the most vulnerable group 
regarding gender-based violence due to the high 
psychological pressure they are exposed to.
123
 
 
4.2 KISTS 
Kists are descendants of ethnic Chechens and 
Ingush who migrated from the North Caucasus 
to Georgia starting from the mid-18
th
 century. 
Numbers of Kists residing in Georgia are 
estimated at 8.000, most of them living in the 
remote Pankisi gorge.
124
 They distinguish 
themselves from other Nakh-speaking peoples 
such as Chechens and Ingush by their customs 
and traditions similar to those of Eastern 
Georgian mountaineers. However, with the 
arrival of refugees from the Chechen war, the 
previously well-integrated Kists experienced an 
identity crisis. The Chechen influence made 
younger Kists to identify as Chechen, whereas 
older generations hold on to the distinct cultural 
character of the Kist community that used to 
prioritize rule and historical traditions over strict 
interpretation of Islamic religion. With the 
arrival of the Chechen refugees a more orthodox 
understanding of Islam began to spread in the 
Pankisi Gorge, fueling inter-generational 
conflict about traditional practices and social 
norms. In 2011, observers estimated that 
between 60% and 80% of young men have 
joined Salafism, an ultraconservative form of 
Sunnism.
125
 This trend has had a severe impact 
on the lives of Kist women in Pankisi by 
exacerbating the already existing discriminative 
practices towards women within the Kist 
community.  
Information on the situation of Kist 
women is comparatively easy to obtain due to 
the strong support of the international 
community. The Kakheti Regional Development 
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Foundation (KRDF) hosts three women‟s clubs 
in the Duisi village and offers vocational 
trainings, as well as small grants programs for 
both men and women. According to KRDF, Kist 
women are very actively involved in the 
activities and have successfully participated in a 
small grants program that was organized by 
KRDF between 2009 and 2010. Roughly half of 
120 proposed projects that were granted by 
KRDF were conducted by and for women.  
However, despite these positive 
developments, Kist women are strongly 
dependent on their husbands‟ and families‟ will, 
as was demonstrated by the fact that 
participation in the women‟s club had to be pre-
approved by the husbands.
126
 Kist women‟s 
choices are widely determined by traditional 
rules (adat), for example depriving them of the 
right to independetly choose their marriage 
partner.
127
 Moreover, as most conflicts within 
the community are resolved by the council of the 
elders, Kist women are not usually afforded the 
opportunity to appeal to Georgian law in case of 
divorces or domestic violence, leaving them 
vulnerable to the often discriminating decisions 
of the male members of their society.  
Due to the problems raised in the 
women‟s clubs, KRDF supported the 
establishment of a „council of women elders‟ to 
counterbalance the traditional male-dominated 
council of elders. Consisting of fifteen well-
respected women from twelve villages, the 
council aims to help solve women‟s problems 
within the scope of traditional customary 
regulations. As already mentioned, those 
problems mainly relate to domestic violence, as 
well as questions related to divorce and child 
custody. In cooperation with the council of 
elders, the women‟s council has so far been 
dealing with nine cases of domestic violence, 
out of which six were decided in favor of the 
woman.  
Many of the new problems Kist women 
face are linked to the spread of more radical 
Islam particularly popular among young men. 
As was expressed by local members of the Salafi 
movement in Duisi during an ECMI Caucasus 
research in 2011, “women should be covered, 
besides hands and face, and should „belong‟ to 
their husbands“.128 According to ECMI 
Caucasus research, young male Kists tend to 
study in religious institutions in Arab countries 
or Turkey and later return to Pankisi to marry.
129
 
Identifying unemployment, lack of development 
prospects and disillusion as the main reasons for 
this trend, many Kist women expressed the wish 
for more sport and leisure facilities for the youth 
in their villages.  
Due to the involvement of international 
organisations, women in Pankisi have become 
increasingly active in the NGOs in their region, 
offering them a forum to discuss their problems 
and find common solutions. This, however, 
cannot hide the fact that many Kist women face 
severe psychological constraints when talking 
about their problems and fears. A need for 
increased psychologist assistance was raised as 
one of the main issues during a discussion in 
Duisi. While the ambition to solve women‟s 
problems within the existing framework of 
customary regulations is understandable to a 
certain extent, it should be taken into account 
that this tendency restricts the access to legal 
services of the Georgian authorities that should 
be made available to all citizens.  
 
4.3 YEZIDI WOMEN 
Estimates of the number of Yezidi Kurds 
currently residing in Georgia vary, but are 
usually put between 6,000 and 12,000.
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Yezidis are one of the most economically 
disadvantaged minorities and often confined to 
menial jobs, such as street sweeping and basic 
agriculture. Tbilisi-based Yezidis are, on the 
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whole, much more integrated in Georgian 
society than their countryside kin. Yezidi 
organizations in Georgia and abroad have 
deplored the massive outmigration of Georgian 
Yezidis, as well as discrimination by the police, 
and warn of a complete disappearance of Yezidi 
culture in Georgia.  
Yezidi women continue to suffer from 
systemic gender-based discrimination inherent 
to the caste system, which forbids marriage 
outside their sub-caste, as well as marriage to a 
non-Yezidi.
131
 Women who break these rules are 
no longer considered part of the ethnic group, 
with ties to their family and places of origin 
severed. Because the Yezidi religion, which 
combines Islamic, Christian and Zoroastrian 
elements, is transferred through patrimonial line, 
the situation for men has traditionally been less 
strict, as long as their non-Yezidi wives were 
willing to convert. The Yezidi practice of 
arranged marriages between young men and 
their first parallel patrilateral cousin is still 
practiced, although precise numbers are not 
available.
132
 Dowry payments are still common 
and exert financial pressure on the grooms‟ 
family. Observance of strict endogamy has only 
started to decline slightly in recent years due to 
the reduced pool of culturally acceptable 
marriage partners in the shrinking community. 
Early marriages remain commonplace, and 
domestic violence is endemic.
133
 
International organizations, such as the 
Hanns Seidel Foundation have remarked on the 
persistence of traditional marriage and gender 
norms among Georgian Yezidi even as Georgian 
society as a whole has made significant headway 
towards liberalization and gender equality.
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Few Yezidi women are allowed to attend school, 
and are often prohibited from leaving the house 
once they are married.
135
 During an interview 
with the Independent League of Yezidi-Kurdish 
Women of Georgia (which has about 30 
members, both male and female), Lili Safarova, 
head of the organization, mentioned slight 
improvements in the situation of Yezidi women, 
who are increasingly emerging as a sole, or 
main, financial contributors of their families, 
somewhat strengthening their position at least in 
the domestic sphere.
136
 They are showing 
interest in national political issues, although trust 
in the democratic process remains low and most 
women abstain from voting. Despite these signs 
of improvement, Dutch supported women‟s 
NGO Mama Cash – one of the main financial 
backers of the Independent League – concludes 
about the results of prevalent gender norms in 
the community that “it is a vicious circle of 
violence, oppression, isolation, lack of education 
and capacity building. It also results in 
economic, emotional and practical dependence 
of women from their families and husbands and 
exclusion of women from any decision making 
bodies.”137 What makes the situation of Yezidi 
women particularly troubling is that they inhabit 
a belief system that precludes adaptation to 
changing circumstances. Even small changes 
that would benefit women (such as allowing 
them to marry outside their group or migrate to 
more economically advanced regions of 
Georgia) are easily seen as wholesale threats to 
the „Yezidi way of life.‟ 
 
4.4 ROMA WOMEN 
Roma women, belonging to the most vulnerable 
individuals in Georgian society, share many of 
the problems Yezidi women are dealing with. 
ECMI expert Elena Proshikian, herself a 
member of the Roma community, estimates the 
number of Romani families who have 
successfully integrated into Georgian society to 
be very low.
138
 Persons of Roma background 
began arriving in Georgia in the early 19
th
 
century, but were better integrated (and less 
easily distinguished) during Soviet times. Today 
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Roma communities are spread across Georgia. 
Because most of Georgian Roma have no 
personal documents and are hard to reach, 
available numbers should be read cautiously. 
The Public Defender, which in recent years has 
begun looking into the group, estimates the total 
number of Roma living in Georgia at 1500. Most 
Georgian Roma speak Russian, several dialects 
of Romani, and Georgian in the case of younger 
members of the community. School attendance 
and access to health care remains very low, 
partially because many Roma do not have 
Georgian identification documents. Many Roma 
settlements have no running water and/or 
electricity. A 2008 ECMI assessment of the 
Roma Community in Georgia shows that the 
Roma community suffers from extreme poverty 
and marginalization, with problems ranging 
from unemployment, lacking access to education 
and health care, lack of appropriate police 
protection to general isolation from the larger 
Georgian society.
139
  
While there is no report specifically 
dealing with the situation of Roma women in 
Georgia, relevant information regarding their 
status and role can be inferred from the general 
literature. With the majority of men unemployed 
and staying at home, women carry the main 
economic burden. Economic activities on which 
Roma communities in Georgia subsist – small-
scale sale of goods and begging – are largely 
undertaken by women, including children. As 
the 2008 ECMI report notes, practical problems 
such as food shortage and housing issues are 
related to the prevalence of very young 
marriages and high birthrates.
140
 Many of the 
settlements are largely populated by very young 
couples, including teenagers, and their children. 
This points to the multiple roles of Roma 
women: not only are they responsible for the 
livelihood of their (often large) families and 
often cast into illegality, but they are also cast 
into childrearing and married life during their 
most formative and vulnerable years. School 
attendance is particularly low among girls and 
young women, contributing to the vicious circle 
of lack of education and subsequently 
opportunities for employment. Domestic 
violence is widespread, but tabooed by the 
community.
141
 Unlike women in other ethnic 
minorities, Romani girls and young women do 
not even have the support of their own 
community, dispersed and with the old 
community structures shattered, to fall back on. 
Because Georgian Roma display virtually no 
unity or cohesion beyond their immediate 
families, Romani women – unlike their Azeri 
and Armenian counterparts, who are at least 
recognized and integrated within their own 
communities – live poor, anonymous, and often 
short lives.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The foregoing chapters explained the situation 
of women in some of Georgia‟s ethnic 
minorities and highlighted the gender-based 
discrimination, and resulting problems, they 
face. A number of concluding remarks about the 
overall findings of this study, and the larger 
questions it raises, are warranted. 
First, discrimination of women 
manifests itself in similar problems, even when 
dealing with culturally and religiously distinct 
(and divergent) minorities. As attested by 
quantitative surveys (in the case of the Azeri and 
Armenian minorities), as well as anecdotal 
evidence (as in the case of the smaller 
minorities), domestic violence continues to 
plague minority women of all ethnicities. 
Despite the fact that an objective assessment of 
the prevalence of domestic violence is 
complicated by psychological and sociological 
factors, it is widely assumed that minority 
women are more likely to experience abuse by 
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their husband or partner, and less likely to 
recognize and report that abuse than ethnic 
Georgians. Compared to mainstream society 
they also marry and have children early, 
sometimes in their mid-teens. Domestic and 
social barriers limit their professional and 
educational opportunities, and perpetuate the 
cycle of discrimination.  
This phenomenon – that women in 
different minorities encounter similar problems 
– is explicable both through a convergence of 
traditional believes about the role of women 
across cultures, and through the fact that all of 
the minority communities surveyed (as distinct 
as they are from each other) are at home in the 
same „mainstream‟ society, affecting them in 
similar ways. Minority women in Georgia for a 
large part live in culturally and geographically 
isolated rural areas remaining widely untouched 
by the liberalization and Westernization of 
Georgian society that occurred in the past two 
decades. It is not because their cultures are 
similar per se, but because their communities are 
similarly detached from mainstream progress 
and thus unable to shake the historically 
engrained conservative value systems, that 
minority women (be they Azeri, Armenian, 
Roma, or Yezidi) all encounter discrimination 
and violence. The urban-rural divide, for 
example in the incidence of domestic violence 
and the absence of economic opportunities, 
demonstrates that ethnic Georgian women in 
areas that are isolated for political, economic, 
geographic, or other non-ethnic reasons, are 
often struggling with similar problems as 
women from ethnic minorities.
142
 This complex 
interplay of different factors shows that in some 
cases ethnic minority women do not only face a 
„double burden‟, as the title of this paper 
suggests, but even a „triple‟ burden of spatial 
isolation (leading to limited access to economic 
resources and state services in rural areas), 
gender discrimination, and the disadvantages 
and issues related to their ethnic communities.  
 However, as similar as the problems of 
women from different ethnic communities might 
be, there are nevertheless groups whose distinct 
ethnic identity is based on essentially 
discriminatory social and cultural norms, as in 
the case of the Yezidi and Romani community. 
This raises the important but admittedly uneasy 
question to what extent group-level minority 
rights should be seen to trump the actual and 
very immediate problems of women in some of 
the most vulnerable minority communities. The 
case of the Yezidis highlights this issue: 
sometimes advances in women‟s right will come 
at the cost of cultural identity (or even cultural 
disappearance), and vice versa. To be sure, the 
aims of strengthening women and preserving 
cultural particularities are not always strictly 
exclusionary (as it appears to be the case with 
the Yezidis), but it is important to keep in mind 
that they can easily come into conflict.  
 The presence and vigor of politically 
and socially active minority women, many of 
whom were interviewed for this report, provides 
some reason for optimism, indicating potential 
progress even in communities where the on-the-
ground situation of women has so far stagnated. 
Yet, one ought not to misunderstand the ideas 
and opinions of women‟s organisations and 
active individuals as fully representative for 
their communities. Nevertheless, their examples 
demonstrate that advancements in gender 
equality are closely linked to the willingness and 
opportunities to further integrate into the 
Georgian society. Proficiency in Georgian 
appears to be a key factor in this regard. Many 
of our interviewees and contact persons were 
proud of their ability to participate in both the 
public life of their country and their national 
minority community. Their social, economic and 
political participation has empowered them with 
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a perhaps more critical but also more conscious 
and self-confident understanding of the 
traditions and values that underpin their 
communities. 
 Given the complexity of power relations 
within families and minority communities, the 
long-term success and effectiveness of measures 
undertaken by international organizations, local 
NGOs and the Georgian government will also 
depend on the engagement and empowerment of 
the various actors involved, including men and 
mothers-in-law. As husbands, community 
leaders, policemen, judges, religious and 
political figures, men exercise enormous 
authority over women‟s lives. Hence, achieving 
greater equality between men and women 
requires boys and men to critically reflect and 
re-evaluate those aspects of traditional notions 
of masculinity that perpetuate the vulnerability 
of women and prevent respectful relationships.  
 While developments in gender equality 
are certainly part of a greater transformational 
process of the social, political and economic 
context, more immediate measures are needed to 
facilitate and ensure the success of this long-
term process. The Georgian government needs 
to increase its efforts to integrate and empower 
minority women and reduce the rural-urban 
divide through specifically tailored educational 
programs and awareness campaigns, gender 
quotas for political parties, as well as the 
provision of state-funded reproductive health 
facilities, shelters and crisis centers for the 
victims of domestic violence in all regions of the 
country. Georgia‟s progressive legislation in 
regard to gender issues is largely due to the 
pressure of the international community and an 
effective legislation will to a great extent depend 
on the government‟s willingness to take 
responsibility and an understanding of gender 
equality as an integral step in the process of 
democratization. Furthermore, it is vital that the 
government improves its data collection in order 
to develop evidence-based policies. Only a 
nation-wide data collection that takes into 
account the interplay of various factors, 
including gender, location, level of education, 
age and ethnicity, will provide an adequate basis 
for effective state policies. Additional research is 
furthermore necessary in regard to smaller and 
most vulnerable women, especially Roma and 
Yezidi women.
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Appendix 
 
List of Interviewed Persons 
 
Nargis Alieva, Union of the Azerbaijani Youth in Georgia 
Sveda Alizade, Sakrebulo deputy and teacher, Marneuli 
Naira Bepieva, Caucasian Mosaic 
Alla Bezhentseva, Union of Russian Women of Georgia 
Nazel Demorchian, Women for a Peaceful Georgia 
Kelim Gumbatov, Union of Azerbaijani Women in Georgia 
Anna Imedashvili, Kakheti Regional Development Foundation (KRDF) 
Samira Ismayilova, Azerbaijani Students‟ Association of Georgia 
Mzia Kochlaeva, International Association of Ossetian Women “Alaneli” 
Marekhi Kirtadze, Anti-Violence Network of Georgia, Akhaltsikhe 
Larisa, intern at Javakheti Citizens‟ Forum 
Leila Mamedova, Union of the Azerbaijani Youth in Georgia 
Paitsar Manasian, Sekrebulo deputy, Akhaltsikhe (v. Sadzeli) 
Seda Melkumian, Javakheti Citizens‟ Forum (JCF) 
Tsira Meskhishvili, “Toleranti” – The Regional Association of Samtskhe-Javakheti 
Sveda Nkhapetian, Sakrebulo member and school principal, Akhaltsikhe (v. Tskaltbila) 
Elena Proshikian, ECMI Caucasus  
Silva Sadojan, Javakheti Citizens‟ Forum (JCF) 
Lili Safarova, Independent League of Yezidi-Kurdish Women of Georgia 
Leila Suleimanova, Union of Azerbaijani Women in Georgia 
Pirusa Tergregorian, Union of Armenian Support 
Jagubov Tschingiskhan (and family), village Kvemo Bolnisi  
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